We study the effect of former Communist party membership on paying bribes to public officials and motivations for bribery, 25 years after the fall of communist rule. Data come from a large representative survey, conducted in post-socialist countries in 2015/16. To deal with endogeneity, we instrument party membership with information on whether family members were affected by the Second World War. Instrumental variable results suggest that links to the former Communist party increase the likelihood of paying bribes today; this result applies to the former party members as well as their children and relatives.
INTRODUCTION
Corruption is a profoundly damaging and widespread phenomenon across the world, but our understanding of why corrupt exchanges occur is still far from complete. The initiative for petty bribe payments -a common form of public sector corruption -may come from public officials who abuse their position and ask public service users for bribes. The initiative may also come from public sector users who offer bribes to receive a better service, express gratitude or because they think bribes are expected. Due to the closed-door nature of bribery, little is known about how informal agreements between public officials and public service users emerge. Yet, understanding these interactions is crucial in the fight against corruption.
Scholars have traditionally considered low pay and lax monitoring as the main causes of bribe taking by public officials (Becker and Stigler, 1974; Gorodnichenko and Sabirianova Peter, 2007; Groenendijk, 1997; Klitgaard, 1988 Klitgaard, , 1991 Lui, 1986; Rose-Ackerman, 1975 , 1978 Shleifer and Vishny, 1993; Zhong, 2016) . More recently, Kwon (2014) showed that civil servants with a high intrinsic and extrinsic motivation for public sector work are less likely to find corruption justifiable. From the perspective of public service users, people with greater income and wealth are more prone to corruption (Gatti et al., 2003; Mocan, 2008; Guerrero and Rodriguez-Oreggia, 2008; Hunt, 2007; Hunt and Laszlo, 2012; Ivlevs and Hinks, 2015b; Swamy et al., 2001; Tavits, 2011; Truex, 2011) . At the same time, several studies, including Hunt and Laszlo (2012) and Kankeu and Ventelou (2016) , find that poor households pay proportionally more in bribes, and Hunt (2007) and Ivlevs and Hinks (2015a) show that adverse life events, such as robbery or a crisis-related job loss, make people more likely to pay bribes to public officials.
This article continues the investigation of why some people are more inclined to pay bribes to public officials than others. Specifically, we study the role of historical political elite networks in explaining present day bribing behaviour of public sector users. This question has received little attention in the literature, and we answer it by focusing on the post-socialist countries and exploring whether people with personal and family links to the former Communist party are more predisposed to bribing public officials more than two decades after the collapse of the Socialist bloc. There are two reasons why this question is important.
First, it has often been argued that the communist past has contributed to the high levels of corruption that have been observed in the post-socialist world since the early 1990s (Kneen, 2000; Sandholtz and Taagepera, 2005) . However, precise mechanisms through which a former regime may be affecting present day bribery remain unclear, and we delve into this question by analysing bribing behaviour of former party members and their relatives. Second, public sector corruption remains one of the top policy challenges in the post-socialist countries. It is therefore important to understand what is driving it, paying particular attention to region-specific factors, such as membership of the former ruling party.
We conjecture that former party members, who were part of an intricate and well-functioning system of informal exchanges during socialist times, will be more predisposed to corruption and, thus, more likely to bribe public officials two decades after the demise of the Socialist bloc. To test this hypothesis, we use data from the Life in Transition-III survey, administered The key challenge of our empirical analysis is the potential endogeneity of former Communist party membership. Endogeneity could be due to unobserved characteristics driving both Communist party membership and inclination to bribery. It could also be due to reverse causality -people may have wanted to join the party to take advantage of corrupt opportunities that party membership brings. To deal with endogeneity, we use the instrumental variable approach where personal and family links to the former Communist party are predicted with the information on whether respondent's family members were affected (killed/injured/displaced) by the Second World War (WWII). In the post-socialist world, WWII veterans as well as civilians affected by WWII were more likely to join or be recruited into the Communist party, and we argue that being affected by the war would have no direct influence on present day corruption -apart from the party membership channel. To strengthen our exclusion restriction, we focus on the post-socialist countries where communist rule did not exist before WWII (i.e. all post-socialist countries except the successor states of the former Soviet Union); this ensures that people did not participate in the war effort with an expectation to join the Communist party and benefit from the corruption-related opportunities associated with it.
Instrumental variable results show that being linked to the former Communist party increases the present day likelihood of bribing public officials. Both the former party members and their children and relatives are more likely to pay bribes than people without the former party connections. We also find that, among those who paid a bribe, people with the party links are more likely to offer bribes to speed up the delivery of the public service, and more likely to consider that bribe payments are expected.
This article contributes to the literature on the individual-level determinants of bribing behavior the developing and post-socialist countries (Gatti et al., 2003; Guerrero and Rodriguez-Oreggia, 2008; Hunt, 2007; Hunt and Laszlo, 2012; Hinks, 2015a, 2015b; Mocan, 2008; Swamy et al., 2001; Tavits, 2011; Truex, 2011) , highlighting the role that the former ruling elite and family networks are likely to play in maintaining corruption long after a political regime change. More specifically, regarding the effects of communism on present day bribery, the study most closely related to ours is Libman and Obydenkova (2013) . They use the example of Russia to explore the relationship between the regional share of the Communist party members in the 1970s' Russia and regional levels of corruption in 2010 and find that regions with a higher historical share of Communist party members have higher levels of present day corruption. While our findings are in congruence with Libman and Obydenkova (2013), we advance this line of research by providing evidence at the individual level, focusing on a range of post-socialist countries and, most importantly, using instrumental variable analysis to uncover causal effects. More broadly, our study is related to the literature on the effects of personal social networks, including parents and family, on criminal and deviant behaviours (see, e.g., Carrington (2011) for an overview). This literature has uncovered a link between social networks and a range of behaviours (illicit drug use, violence, offensive sexual behaviour, smoking) but overlooked outcomes related to bribery and corruption. We fill this gap by analysing the effects of personal and family former elite networks on the likelihood and motivations for paying bribes.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the relationship between Communist party membership and corruption from a historical perspective, discusses why such links may have persisted to the present day, and outlines hypotheses to be tested. Section 3 describes the data, variables and estimation strategy. Section 4 presents the findings, followed by a discussion and conclusion in section 5.
COMMUNIST PARTY MEMBERSHIP AND CORRUPTION: CONCEPTUAL CHANNELS AND HYPOTHESES TO BE TESTED
Across the former socialist world, members of the ruling Communist party had significant access to economic resources and the power to distribute them. The nature of the centrally planned economic system meant that public officials, who also had to be members of the Communist party (Rigby, 1980) , were powerful actors in deciding what, where and how much was produced. The supply shortages and production inefficiencies associated with economic planning meant that planners had "…to counteract its over-centralization and its ideological limitations through the intricate schemes of informal exchange, regional and industrial lobbying, and a variety of practices for cheating the system" (Ledeneva, 2006, p1) .
Informal practices, petty corruption and large-scale bribes were common among public officials and the political elite. Participants governed these networks themselves and these behaviors became deeply rooted with little to combat them (Holmes, 1993; Rose et al, 1998; Rose, 2001; Rigby, 1980) . Campaigns to purge the system of corrupt officials, notably in the 1980s, failed to reduce the extent of these informal practices (Holmes, 1993) .
The networks of the Communist party did not disappear after the demise of the Socialist bloc.
In the immediate transitional period following the regime change, many members of the Communist party retained high-level administrative and political positions and, being in charge of the privatization process, started to realize profitable business opportunities (Sik and Wellman, 1999) . These activities provided a thriving environment for both bribe taking and bribe offering. It has indeed been argued that the Communist regime contributed to corruption during this transition period (Kneen, 2000; Sandholtz and Taagepera, 2005 If the corrupt networks associated with the ruling elite or corruption habits that the party members acquired under Socialism have persisted over time, we might expect former Communist party members to be more predisposed to bribery today: they would be more likely to pay bribes in general and engage in more assertive bribing behaviour (for example, more likely to offer bribes to public officials as opposed to being asked for bribes by public officials). It is also possible that the informal networks of former Communist party members and/or their corruption habits have been transmitted not only across political regimes but also to children and relatives. For example, Djankov et al. (2005) find that having a father who was a Communist party member increases the chances of being an entrepreneur.
1 Arguably, as part of an informal network that provides access to material benefits, the children and relatives of party members would have more opportunities to use informal methods, such as bribery, to attain their goals. In addition, given that the children and relatives of party members benefited from the material privileges enjoyed by party members during socialist times (Volgyes, 1995) , they were exposed to the informal processes associated with obtaining these benefits. This may have influenced their attitudes towards corruption and other informal exchanges, bringing them in line with those of party members themselves.
2 Therefore, one could expect that, after the fall of socialism, not only party members but also 1 See also Stoica (2004) showing that the former party cadres are more likely to be entrepreneurs in Romania.
2 Furthermore, the children may be modelling unethical behaviour more generally (not just bribe-paying or bribe-seeking) and bribery is one common and relatively measurable manifestation of it for both parents and children. Other manifestations may be more difficult to measure. 
Variables

Outcome variable: Bribery
The question that we use to capture public sector bribery has a nested structure. First, respondents were asked whether, in the last 12 months, they or any of their household members had had contact with the following public officials or institutions: interacting with road police; requesting official documents (visa, passport) from authorities; going to court for civil matters; receiving public education (primary or secondary); receiving public education (vocational); receiving medical treatment in the public health system; requesting unemployment benefits; requesting social security benefits. If the answer was positive, the respondents were asked whether an unofficial payment or gift was made to the public official.
Using this information, we construct a dummy variable paid a bribe which is equal to 1 if a bribe was paid to at least one type of public official, and 0 if there was contact with at least one type of public official but no bribe was paid.
Overall, 17% of respondents in our sample paid a bribe to at least one type of public official (see Table A1 of the Supplementary Information document for summary statistics of all variables included in the analysis; see section 3.3 for which countries are included in the final sample). Note that this variable excludes the respondents who had no contact with any public official (28% of the sample) in the 12 months prior to the interview. In the empirical analysis, we will use the Heckman correction procedure to check whether excluding these respondents results in a sample selection bias.
Those respondents who said they paid a bribe were asked a follow-up question about their motivation to do so. There were four possible answers: 1) "I was asked to pay", 2) "I was not asked to pay but I knew that an informal payment was expected", 3) "I offered to pay, to get things done quicker or better", and 4) "I was not asked to pay but I wanted to express my gratitude". These reasons were mentioned by 16%, 33%, 19% and 34% of bribe payers, respectively. We create a dichotomous variable for each of the four reasons, equal to 1 if the respondent mentioned a reason in relation to paying a bribe to at least one type of public official and 0 otherwise. 
Control variables
Following the literature on the micro-determinants of corruption (e.g., Ivlevs and Hinks, 2015a,b) , all regressions include the following control variables (see table A1 of Supplementary Information for summary statistics of all variables): gender; age (in years) and its square; three levels of education (primary, secondary, tertiary); a household wealth index; 5 a self-perceived position on a 10-step income ladder; 6 and degree of urbanization (rural, urban other than capital city, capital city). In addition, we include dichotomous variables for every country (country-fixed effects) to account for all country-level influences on both the prevalence of bribery and links to the former Communist party. Among other things, using country-fixed effects ensures that the estimated coefficients capture within-, rather than between-, country relationships of the variables of interest.
Estimation strategy and instruments
Our objective is to estimate the following baseline models: 
where, for individual i living in country j, Communist party stands for variables capturing personal or family links to the former Communist party, reasons for bribery stands for the four motivations to pay bribes, and individual-level controls and country-fixed effects are as described above.
Note that, in Equations (1) and (2), parameter β1 captures the association between the former Communist party membership and bribing behaviour. The Communist party variable is potentially endogenous, meaning that β1 may not reflect the true (causal) effect of party membership on present day bribery. Endogeneity could be due to reverse causality (people joined the party because they wanted to take advantage of corrupt party networks) or unobserved factors, such as personality traits, affecting both joining the party and bribing public officials. To mitigate endogeneity and move closer to causal effects, we employ the instrumental variable technique. This approach necessitates one or more variablesinstruments -that are highly correlated with the endogenous regressor (personal and family links to the Communist party) and affect the outcome (bribery) only through the endogenous regressor. The estimation consists of two stages: in the first stage, the endogenous regressor is regressed on the instrument(s) as well as the full set of control variables. In the second stage, the outcome is regressed on the predicted values of the endogenous regressor from the firststage equation and the full set of controls.
Our proposed instruments for personal and family links to the former Communist party draw on information about the involvement of respondents' family members in the Second World War (WWII). Across the former socialist world, returning soldiers and civilians who suffered during WWII were venerated as liberators and heroes. Furthermore, WWII veterans (and in many cases civilians who were affected by war) were encouraged, and given priority, to join the Communist party and take leading positions in the government and various administrative bodies; managerial and power positions were indeed created for war returnees and a wartime record, coupled with the Communist party membership, provided an opportunity to move up the social ladder (Edele, 2008) . In the former Soviet Union, the Communist party in many ways was an organisation of ex-WWII warriors (Rigby, 1968) ; similar involvement of WWII veterans in the ruling communist parties is documented in other countries of the socialist block (Popov, 2004; Antic, 2017) .
Our expectation is that people who themselves, or whose parents and grandparents, fought in, or were otherwise affected by, WWII would be more likely to have either personal affiliation or family links to the Communist party (instrument relevance). The absence of a direct effect of being affected by WWII (or being a descendant of such people) on present day corruption (instrument exogeneity) necessitates further discussion. First, it is not impossible -although quite unlikely -that, when WWII started, people joined the army because they anticipated that it would be easier to become members of the ruling party during or after the war and subsequently benefit from the advantages that party membership brings (for example, be in power/managerial positions and exploit corrupt networks). Necessary conditions for this to happen are: 1) the Communist party being in power prior to the war; 2) people expecting the Communist party to be in power after the war; and 3) people knowing that being a party member brings benefits, including opportunities for corrupt exchanges. Second, where
Communist rule existed before WWII, party members may have been more -or less -likely to join (or be drafted into) the army than non-members. In these cases, willingness to join or actual party membership would drive participation in WWII, potentially invalidating the instrument. Such cases, however, are only possible where Communist rule was firmly established before WWII, i.e., in the successor states of the Soviet Union, with a probable exception of the three Baltic States and Moldova, which were annexed by the Soviet Union in
(the Soviet Union entered WWII in 1941).
On the contrary, the non-Soviet countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) did not have Communist rule before WWII; Communist parties in these countries were weak, underground organisations at best (Hanley, 2003) . In many cases, Communist parties gained support during WWII, as they opposed Nazi rule that prevailed in many parts of the CEE region during the war. However, the major push that the CEE Communist parties received was straight after WWII when the Red Army liberated the region from Nazi rule -and took control over it at the same time. CEE countries became part of the sphere of political influence of the USSR, with the Soviet institutional and political blueprints being quickly imposed upon the newly established governments. Communist Party membership in CEE grew fast (Henley, 2003) , and ex-WWII warriors -liberators from fascism -enjoyed a privileged access to the party. As was stated in a resolution passed at a communist rally in (Wightman and Brown, 1975, p.375 and 12% of the sample (ranging from 4 in Albania to 34% in Estonia) provided a positive answer to the second (moved as a result of WWII) question (see Table A2 of the Supplementary Information document for individual country means).
Despite the binary nature of the variables paid a bribe and reasons for bribery, we estimate the instrumental variables models with the two stage least squares (2SLS). 8 To make the comparisons between IV and non-IV results possible, the models that do not account for endogeneity are also estimated with OLS (linear probability models). The results of the corresponding instrumental variable probit and binary probit models are fully consistent with the 2SLS and the linear probability estimations (see Tables A3 and A4 of the Supplementary   Information document) .
Finally, we also address a possible sample selection bias arising from the fact that only people who contacted public officials can be included in the bribery models. To check for the existence of the bias and correct for it, we apply the standard Heckman correction procedure (Heckman, 1979) . Consistent with the previous literature tackling the sample selection bias in bribery models (Ivlevs and King, 2015b) , the set of variables identifying contact with public officials in the selection equation includes dichotomous variables for: 1) having children under 18 in the household; 2) being a student; and 3) having poor health. The Heckman correction is applied in both the non-IV and IV models; for the latter the procedure consists of obtaining the inverse mills ratios from the selection equation and including them in both the first and the second stages of the IV estimation (see section 19.6.2 of Wooldridge (2010)).
RESULTS
We start by reporting the results of the models that do not account for the endogeneity of the Communist party variables (section 4.1.), followed by the results of the IV estimations (section 4.2.).
package for the main alternative -instrumental variable probit (ivprobit) -does not include the F test of excluded instruments (which, however, could be computed manually), and the overidentification (AmemiyaLee-Newey) test is only possible to perform after a two-step estimation, which cannot be 1) run with robust standard errors and 2) used to calculate marginal effects. As a robustness check, we have estimated the corresponding ivprobit models (see Table A3 of the Supplementary Information document), and the results of the overidentification tests (from a two-step estimation) and the marginal effects of the regressors of interest (from a standard estimation with robust standard errors) are fully consistent with the 2SLS results. (2008) and Hunt and Lazslo (2012) and is typically explained by a contention that better-off people can afford to pay bribes. The results of the selection equation are also of interest, as selection into contact with public officials affects bribery indirectly (Hunt, 2007;  9 The (average) marginal effect from a corresponding probit estimation is 3.7 percentage points. Ivlevs and Hinks, 2015b) . Specifically, we find that, other things equal, people with links to the Communist party are about 10 percentage points more likely to contact public officials. The dependent variable in Column 1 is a dichotomous variable paid a bribe; the model is estimated with OLS (linear probability model) on the subsample of respondents who had a contact with public officials. The results of the Heckman correction model, estimated on the full sample of respondents, are shown in Columns 2 (selection into contact with public officials) and 3 (bribe payment conditional on contact with public officials); the identification variables for contact with public officials are: having children in the household, being a student and reporting poor health. The selection equation is estimated with binary probit and the results in Column 2 show the probit average marginal effects. *** significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. Omitted groups in all specifications are: male, secondary education, living in rural area. Countries included in the analysis: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Hungary, Kosovo, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia. Table 2 reports the correlates of different reasons for bribery; these estimations draw on the sample of respondents who, in the 12 months prior to the interview, paid a bribe to at least one type of public official. Controlling for other characteristics, people with a link to the former Communist party (Column 3) are approximately 4 percentage points more likely to say that they offered a bribe to get things done quicker and better (this is an increase of 21% relative to the outcome average, which is 19%). Concerning the three other reasons for paying a bribe, the Communist party variable is statistically insignificant (Columns 2, 3 and 5), implying that people with Communist party links are as likely as people without party links to pay bribes because they are asked to do so by public officials, know informal payments are expected, and to express gratitude.
Communist Party links and bribe payments: correlational results
Among control variables, women are less likely to say that they were asked for bribes and that they paid a bribe because it was expected but more likely to make bribe payments to express gratitude. Wealthier people are less likely to say that they were asked for bribe by public officials but more likely to say that they paid a bribe to get things done quicker and better. Finally, those living in capital cities are more likely to say that they were asked for a bribe and that they paid a bribe to get things done quicker and better. Notes: The four dependent variables in Columns 1-4 are dichotomous variables capturing a specific reason for paying a bribe. Models are estimated with OLS (linear probability models) on a subsample of respondents who paid a bribe to at least one type of public official. *** significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. Omitted groups in all specifications are: male, secondary education, living in rural area. Countries included in the analysis: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Hungary, Kosovo, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia.
Next, Table 3 decomposes the variable capturing any connection to the Communist party into three components: 1) the respondent him/herself was a party member; 2) the respondent is a child of a former party member; and 3) the respondent is a relative of a former party member. Notes: The dependent variable in Column 1 is a dichotomous variable paid a bribe; the model is estimated on the subsample of respondents who had a contact with public officials. The dependent variables in Columns 2-5 are dichotomous variables capturing a specific reason for paying a bribe; these models are estimated on a subsample of respondents who paid a bribe to at least one type of public official. All models are estimated with OLS (linear probability model). *** significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. Omitted groups in all specifications are: male, secondary education, living in rural area. Countries included in the analysis: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Hungary, Kosovo, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia. approximately 27-29 percent, the likelihood of offering bribes to get things done quicker and better (the estimate significant at the 5% level) as well as the likelihood of considering that bribe payments are expected (significant at 10%).
Communist Party links and bribe payments: instrumental variable results
12 The IV estimates of the Communist party variable are insignificant in the 'being asked for a bribe' and the gratitude models. . *** significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. Omitted groups in all specifications are: male, secondary education, living in rural area. Countries included in the analysis: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Hungary, Kosovo, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia.
Finally, Table 6 reports the IV results for the bribery model when the generic Communist party variable is decomposed into personal membership and family links (children and other relatives of party members). We conduct three IV estimations each including only one partyrelated variable, instrumented with the same two WWII-related instruments. Note that in the personal party membership specification (Column 1 and 2 of Table 6 ), we drop respondents who were younger than 18 in 1989 (younger than 44 at the time of the interviews in 2015). This is because, as children, these respondents could technically not be party members.
13
In all three cases, we obtain strong support for instrument relevance and exogeneity: the 14 Given the average likelihood of paying a bribe of 17%, these are very large effects, especially for personal party membership. 
Additional robustness checks
Given some heterogeneity of the type communism, political regime etc. across countries included in the sample, we checked if our results could be driven by a specific country. To do this, we re-estimated our main instrumental-variable model (Column 2 in Table 4) Note: The vertical axis shows the estimated coefficient and the 95% confidence interval of the Communist party variable in an instrumental variable regression when one country is excluded at a time (horizontal axis). The benchmark estimate is based on a specification that includes all countries (Column 2 of Table 4 ).
Next, we consider a potential threat to the exogeneity of our instruments related to the contention that people affected by WWII lived in urban areas and especially big cities - Estimate excluding a country 95% confidence interval Benchmark (full-sample) estimate because this is where bombing would occur. 15 If urban dwellers have more frequent contact with public officials and are more predisposed to bribery, and if such predisposition to bribery is transmitted across generations, instrument validity may be compromised. The inclusion of control for living in a capital and an urban area other than capital should, to some extent, address these concerns. In addition, we have estimated our models on a sample of respondents living in rural areas and the results, available in Table A4 of the Supplementary Information document, confirmed a positive and statistically significant relationship between the party membership and bribery, in line with the full-sample estimations.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Across the former socialist world, a defining feature of the ruling Communist party elite was its engagement in corrupt deals and practices. While it has often been argued that the history of communist rule has contributed to the high levels of corruption observed in the postsocialist countries today, little was known about the exact mechanisms through which the former political regime may have been affecting present day corruption. This article aimed to shed light on this question by studying corruption behaviour and the attitudes of people with personal and family connections to the former Communist party, more than two decades after the breakdown of the Socialist bloc. We hypothesized that former Communist party membership leads to a higher likelihood of bribing public officials and more assertive bribing behaviour. We then tested these hypotheses using the instrumental variable technique and data from a large representative survey conducted in post-socialist countries in 2015/16.
Our key finding is that links to the former Communist party result in a higher likelihood of bribing public officials -on average by 13 percentage points. This finding supports our first hypothesis that people with a connection to the party are more likely to bribe public officials.
As such, it substantiates a broader claim that former communist rule has contributed to present day corruption and, unsurprisingly, identifies people with party links as a main channel through which corruption has been 'transferred' across time and political regimes.
We also find that both former party membership and family links to a party member (being a child or relative) increase the likelihood of bribing public officials. This finding supports the conjecture that the corruption-inducing networks created by the former ruling elite were transmitted through family.
We also examined the motivations for bribery. Our hypothesis was that people with party links would engage in more assertive bribing behaviour: for example, they would offer bribes to public officials rather than be solicited for them. The results supported this hypothesis:
among bribe payers, links to the former Communist party result in a higher likelihood of offering bribes to get things done quicker and better. We also found that connections to the former ruling party makes people bribe because they think bribes are expected. This suggests that the Communist party fostered the development of corruption norms among its members, and these norms were transmitted across time and family.
Our analysis has revealed that the association between the links to the former ruling party and the likelihood of bribery is lower than the effect of the party links on present-day bribery.
For example, estimations that do not account for endogeneity suggest the former party members and the their relatives (other than children) are as likely to pay bribes as people without party connections, while the instrumental variable results show that former party membership and being a relative of a former party member increase the likelihood of paying bribes. A possible explanation for this is a self-selection of people with particular characteristics into party membership. Specifically, it is possible that many people who joined the party during communist times strongly believed in communist ideals and, as such, had low tolerance towards bribery and other unlawful behaviours. 16 However, focusing on people who joined the Communist party for a reason that, we argue, is not related to one's inclination to pay bribes (because they fought or were otherwise affected by WWII) suggests a positive effect: in other words, former ruling party membership per se increases the likelihood of paying bribes long after the regime change.
The implications of our findings are twofold. First, our study reveals a group of peopleformer Communist party members and their children and relatives -who are susceptible to bribing public officials in the post-socialist space. Policymakers willing to reduce corruption could direct their efforts toward this group. Examples of actions include: monitoring interactions with public officials; given a greater likelihood of people with party links to offer bribes to public officials, a greater use of e-government to reduce face-to-face interactions with public officials as well as providing more opportunities for public officials to report bribe offerings in a safe and confidential way; and working with people linked to the party to change their attitudes towards bribery (see e.g. Weaver, 2015) . Second, our findings suggest that corruption in the post-socialist countries is sustained over time and across generations, most likely through the persistence of informal networks 17 and/or cultural habits acquired in the recent past. This implies that regime change per se does not lead to the dismantling of networks or social norms and that the influence of these can resonate long into the future. These results align with the notion of institutional path dependency, whereby institutions, networks and norms are likely to persist even after a drastic political regime change (see e.g. Acemoglu and Robinson, 2010) . From this perspective, our findings are relevant in the contexts of countries experiencing political transitions -both in the postsocialist world and beyond.
Conclusion
The article has explored the effects of former Communist party membership on paying bribes to public officials more than two decades after the fall of communist rule. Using data from a large representative survey conducted in post-socialist countries in 2015/16 and instrumental variable analysis, we found that links to the former Communist party increase the likelihood of bribing public officials -this applies to the former party members as well as their children and other relatives. Considering motivations for bribe payments, we found that the Communist party connections increase the likelihood of offering bribes to speed up or get a better public service, as well as the likelihood that a person considers that bribe payments are expected. Overall, our results suggest that the networks and social habits of the former Communist party members did not disappear with the regime change but were instead transmitted through family and thus sustained over time. 
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